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CHAPTER 11: BRINGING IT ALL TOGETHER
The complexity of innovation governance systems — from the focus on risk-
related policies and public engagement, to the rigidity of product regulatory 
frameworks — helps us to avoid potentially hazardous developments, but it also 
stifles potentially useful innovation.
Joyce Tait 
(University of Edinburgh)
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Risk and innovation are contested topics in most fields of human endeavour.  As the preceding chapters have shown, wherever one looks there is great variation, 
between and within nations and societies, in the ways we 
perceive the risks and benefits from innovations and in the 
ways we govern them. However, the prevailing expectation 
in most societies is that there will be a continuing trend in 
the development of innovations that will improve our lives 
through economic, health-related or environmental benefits1.
And the risk governance processes we choose to put in 
place for innovative technologies will determine not just 
which products and processes are developed, but also what 
scale of company can participate in their development and 
ultimately the competitive advantage of nations and regions2.
Given the importance of innovation to us all, we need 
a good understanding of how public and stakeholder 
pressures interact with risk regulatory systems and of how 
both stakeholders and regulators then guide innovation, 
encouraging some developments and closing off others. 
Specialist expertise is required in a range of contexts: to 
provide the evidence needed to make competent decisions 
on risk regulation, to conduct fair and equitable stakeholder 
engagement, or to develop an innovative product or process.
But there is also an important requirement for a balanced 
generalist overview to understand how these specialisms 
and influences interact with one another in ways that can 
either be detrimental to, or support, particular innovations. 
In making decisions on risk regulation for advanced 
innovative technologies, regulators have often ignored 
the impacts of their decisions on innovative capacity and 
have, until very recently, given little consideration to how 
‘smarter’ regulatory approaches could deliver safety and 
efficacy more cheaply and rapidly than current regimes. This 
is particularly the case for companies developing chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals, health care products based on regenerative 
medicine, pesticides, genetically modified (GM) crops and 
products based on nanotechnology and synthetic biology. 
This chapter considers how issues of risk, trust, politics, 
benefits, engagement and regulation have combined to 
create the environment in which today’s innovators must 
operate. The two decades spanning the transition from the 
twentieth to the twenty-first centuries saw the emergence 
and implementation of a new governance agenda that has 
had very considerable political influence. It has radically 
altered the innovation environment, particularly in areas 
of technology development that are likely to be publicly 
contested, with mixed outcomes and in many cases 
suboptimal delivery of public benefits from new scientific 
discoveries3.
 
 
Regulation and the new governance agenda
Towards the end of the twentieth century, building on 
research in the social sciences, the concept of governance 
(the process of governing) began to shift in response to 
pressures from: the emergence of unexpected problems 
with technologies previously considered safe; a decline in 
public trust of government bodies and industry; the rapid 
pace of scientific development and technological change; the 
difficulties policymakers had in keeping up with this pace of 
change; and commercial pressures arising from globalization4. 
Two distinct academic disciplinary perspectives contributed 
to the development of this new governance agenda with 
little overlap among academic participants or literature cited, 
but with a common focus on the development of more 
participative, democratic decision making processes.
The first, led by academic policy researchers, envisaged 
a change in the role of the state from top-down regulation 
to a new governance style based on greater participation 
by non-governmental actors. The state changed from being 
the main implementer and controller of policy outcomes 
to facilitating and coordinating interaction between the 
various interests involved5, giving rise to metaphors such as 
the ‘hollowing out of the state’6 or ‘steering not rowing’7. 
The presumption was that government, having set the 
parameters in terms of the policy goals, then delegated 
to others how those goals were to be achieved. These 
ideas were developed in a general policy context and the 
literature makes little reference to risk and innovation, but 
they were influential across all policy areas and created 
a receptive policy space for the ideas emerging from the 
second academic perspective. 
The second strand of academic thinking that contributed 
to the new governance agenda arose in science and 
technology studies (STS) and focused very strongly on issues 
of risk and innovation. It challenged the authority of science, 
particularly its presumed impartiality and its role as provider 
of public benefits. This strand of STS thinking was concerned 
about the undemocratic nature of this dominance of science 
on government decision making and sought to change the 
political landscape, again towards greater public participation 
in regulatory decision making8. Two related factors in 
STS thinking were particularly important in delivering 
the political influence they sought: (i) questioning the 
authority of scientific expertise and the validity of scientific 
The prevailing expectation 
in most societies is that 
there will be a continuing 
trend in the development 
of innovations that will 
improve our lives.
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evidence used to support policy and regulatory decisions 
by government9; and (ii) focusing much of their discourse 
on uncertainty and risk with the precautionary principle (or 
approach) being seen as the policy answer to this challenge. 
Alongside this new bottom-up governance agenda, in 
technology-related areas there is still a need for regulation 
based on top-down command and control, backed up by 
sanctions and penalties to regulate the safety to human 
health and the environment of innovative products and of 
the processes used to develop them.  As the governance 
agenda was bringing in a softer, more participative approach, 
existing regulatory regimes were changing in the opposite 
direction. Each time a new form of risk has been found in 
a class of products, a new layer or branch has been added 
to the regulatory system to ensure that future products 
will be safe from that type of defect. For example, following 
the discovery of birth defects caused by thalidomide, all 
new drugs were required to be tested for teratogenicity. 
In pesticide development, the damage to wildlife caused 
by organochlorine insecticides led to the rejection from 
development pipelines of any new pesticide that was likely to
be persistent in the environment.  As a result, the products 
in use today have never been safer. However, the regulatory 
systems themselves have become more complex, more time 
consuming and considerably more costly for the companies 
that need to work with them (it now takes approximately 
10 years, and up to £300 million, to cover the regulatory 
requirements for a new GM crop variety and up to £1 billion
for a new drug). 
The shift to a new governance approach towards the end 
of the twentieth century can thus be seen as the addition 
of a new form of oversight for industry sectors that were 
already bearing a heavy and increasing regulatory burden. 
Indeed, there has been an increase in the complexity of the 
 
 
operating environment for innovators to accommodate 
the new focus on engagement and dialogue and to come to 
terms with the difficulties regulators have experienced in 
operationalizing the precautionary principle10. These issues 
are part of the background to the case study on GM crops 
in this chapter, and would be relevant to the alternative risk 
management strategy that it outlines.  A possible example 
of such an approach, bringing together evidence-based 
regulation along with a continuing emphasis on openness 
and engagement, is given in the case study in Chapter 6 on 
changes to pig inspection.
TABLE 1
The implications and outcomes related to engagement 
on the basis of interests and ideology (minds and hearts)15.
Interest-based engagement
(minds)
Ideology-based engagement
(hearts)Un
co
m
m
itted
 m
em
b
ers o
f th
e p
u
blic
Restricted to specific 
developments
Location specific, locally organized
Conflict can usually be resolved by: 
• providing information
• giving compensation
• negotiation
Giving concessions leads to mutual 
accommodation
Negative events lead to adjustments 
in products and processes
Spreads across related and 
sometimes unrelated developments
Organized nationally or internationally
Conflict is very difficult to resolve:
• information is treated as propaganda
• compensation is seen as bribery
• negotiation is seen as betrayal
Giving concessions leads to 
escalation of demands
Responses to negative events 
are disproportionate
The products in use today 
have never been safer. 
However, the regulatory 
systems themselves have 
become more complex, 
more time consuming and 
considerably more costly.
Participatory processes
Emerging from the new perspectives on risk governance 
and the emphasis on participative democracy, stakeholder 
engagement has become an essential requirement for 
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scientists undertaking innovation-related research and for 
companies developing the resulting products and processes. 
The emphasis on uncertainty and precaution among STS 
academics led, in the first decade of this century, to the 
promotion of ‘upstream engagement’ as a key component 
of the new governance agenda. The think-tank Demos, in a 
policy publication advocating upstream engagement11, made 
clear its political ambitions: “the task is to make visible the 
invisible, to expose to public scrutiny the assumptions, values 
and visions that drive science”, and “… reshape … the very 
foundations on which the scientific enterprise rests”. 
Psychologists tell us that where issues are remote from 
society (as in upstream engagement or the development of 
truly novel technologies), citizens are more likely to engage 
with an issue on the basis of values or ideology rather 
than local personal interest12. In such cases, conflict and 
polarization of views are more likely to arise and resolution 
of any conflict will be more difficult to achieve13 (see Table 
CASE STUDY
A CASE HISTORY ON GM CROPS
David Baulcombe (University of Cambridge)
The first generation of genetically modified (GM) crops has delivered diverse and well-documented benefits. They have helped to 
stabilize soil and increase the efficiency of water 
use. They have also reduced pesticide toxicity for 
farmworkers and beneficial insects, and increased the 
profitability of agriculture in regions as diverse as India 
(GM cotton) and Hawaii (GM papaya).
The potential for benefit from GM is further 
enhanced by research in universities, institutes and 
companies, which have produced an extensive range 
of additional GM traits. These traits could improve 
the sustainability of crop production, or they could 
improve the quality of the crop products for nutrition 
or industry. In the near future there are exciting 
new genome editing methodologies that will further 
reinforce the transformative potential of GM in global 
agriculture. The detailed description of these potential 
benefits is described in a report produced for the UK 
government’s Council for Science and Technology1.
A European logjam on GM
However, the full benefits of these GM traits are 
yet to be realized, especially in European 
Union, because complicated regulatory 
and approval processes have deterred 
commercial interest and excluded non-
commercial applications. Only three GM 
crops have been approved for commercial 
cultivation in Europe since 1990 (ref. 2).  
An application for a GM maize (Dupont 
Pioneer’s TC1507) was made in 2000, but is still 
in limbo even though the line is very similar to a 
previously-approved variety. In the United States, 
there have been 96 commercial GM approvals since 
1990 and a healthy stream of applications to the 
regulatory process.  Australia has approved 12 GM 
crops since 2002 (ref. 1). 
Europe has a global leadership role and our 
logjam suppresses innovation in other countries. 
These countries may model their GM approval process on 
that of Europe, or they may prohibit GM crops because they 
are concerned that their cultivation would restrict their 
opportunity to export non-GM crops to Europe3. 
Risk and hazard in the European Union’s regulatory 
process
The current EU regulation of GM crops has two stages. 
First the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) assesses 
an application and expresses an opinion based on scientific 
evidence on whether a crop under evaluation is safe. If 
EFSA delivers a favourable safety opinion, the European 
Commission will then prepare a draft decision to authorise 
commercial cultivation, which is considered and voted on 
by an official EU committee of representatives from the 
Member States.
This process is expensive and time consuming, however, 
because it is based on the presumption of hazard. The 
process also has to be implemented in full for each 
application, irrespective of whether the GM trait is 
associated with any risk. The United States has a more 
streamlined regulatory process for the commercial release 
of a GM crop, but even there it can cost US$7 million 
to US$14 million (in 2007 prices)4 — an amount 
that is prohibitive for small- and medium-sized 
enterprises. In Europe the costs could be 
greater, and innovation is correspondingly less 
likely. 
The inappropriateness of the current EU 
approval process is illustrated by comparing 
GM with conventional plant breeding. There 
is great uncertainty associated with conventional 
breeding, because there is an unanticipated degree 
of genetic variation between closely related plants. 
The genomes of maize plants in a breeders cross, 
for example, may each have several hundred genes 
that are absent from the other parent5. It is difficult 
to predict the consequence of interactions between 
these genes in the hybrids produced by a conventional 
breeding programme. Further complications arise in 
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conventional breeding because there may be epigenetic 
effects on gene expression in a hybrid plant that persist 
for many generations6 after the initial hybridization event. 
GM may also involve similar genetic and epigenetic 
uncertainties, but to a much more limited extent 
because there will normally be only one or a few 
transgenes in each line. One response to this 
comparison would be to introduce additional regulation 
for conventionally bred crops. However, the past 
experience of thousands of years of breeding — 
including modern breeding for the past hundred years 
— illustrates the absurdity of that conclusion.  A more 
rational response would be to use conventional breeding 
as a benchmark: additional assessment would be 
appropriate if there is plausible additional risk associated 
with the GM trait relative to a conventionally bred 
variety. 
The inappropriate differentiation of GM and 
conventional crops is illustrated by several recent 
examples in which the crop carries a transgene that 
could have been transferred by conventional breeding7, 
albeit through a process that would take longer than 
with GM. The GM crops with the new gene would be 
subject to the EFSA/EU approval process, whereas the 
conventionally bred variety with the same gene would 
not, although the risks to health or the environment 
would be similar with both types of plant. 
An alternative risk management strategy in crop 
improvement
A revised strategy for innovation in EU crops would 
have a more risk- rather than hazard-based structure 
than the current process. It would take into account 
the evidence that there is no inherent environmental or 
nutritional hazard in the process of genetic modification, 
and it would also consider the risks associated with the 
failure to innovate. It is unlikely that small revisions to 
the current process are likely to achieve an outcome 
that promotes innovation towards a sustainable 
agriculture of crops — instead, a new process should 
be derived based on the principles of risk assessment 
as applied in other industries.  Where risks are difficult 
to quantify, it would be appropriate to implement GM-
specific procedures only if the risk is assessed as being 
greater than with an equivalent variety produced by 
conventional breeding.  
1). In essence, the more developed a particular application 
towards its end purpose, the more deliberative and 
meaningful the conversation is likely to be.  When citizens 
are unfamiliar with the issues at stake, engagement processes 
— whether upstream or downstream — can thus become 
a process of framing these unfamiliar developments, either 
favourably or unfavourably, in the public mind, potentially 
giving considerable power to those who conduct the 
engagement14. 
These points are raised in the Annual Report of the 
Government Chief Scientific Adviser 2014. Innovation: 
Managing Risk, Not Avoiding It under the heading 
‘Anticipating the Challenges’, where it is noted that the 
categories of innovation likely to lead to the most heated 
discussion are (i) where the wider benefits of an innovation 
are accepted but where highly local costs and impacts are 
imposed, and (ii) where the debate is largely about values. 
Table 1 illustrates some of the characteristics of dialogue 
under these contrasting circumstances, demonstrating why 
value- or ideology-based conflicts are most difficult of all 
to resolve (as continues to be the case for GM and related 
technologies).
Despite such problems, the initial assumption of scientists 
and science funders was that upstream engagement would, 
if managed properly, improve public acceptance of new 
technologies and would not bring an end to any area of 
research16. However, as noted above, Demos17 expected 
upstream engagement to have profound implications for the 
future of science and to reshape the way that science relates 
to public decision making.  Although upstream engagement 
has been widely undertaken, for example by UK research 
councils18, 19, Demos’ ambitions have not yet been achieved. 
Also, there is not yet any evidence that better public 
acceptance of new innovative technologies will result from 
such engagement and in practice there have been reductions 
in funding for some areas of science and innovation, 
particularly in nanotechnology20 and plant biotechnology, 
arising from political influences and policy makers’ concerns 
about negative public opinion rather than evidence of 
potential or actual harm.  As noted in case study on GM 
crops, such considerations have also influenced the extent to 
which GM crops are being cultivated in Europe21.
Another presumption has been that, through the new 
governance approach, policy-makers would simultaneously 
engage with a wider range of stakeholders and also base 
their decisions on better quality evidence.  A common tactic 
among the diverse groups and networks of stakeholders 
Psychologists tell us that 
where issues are remote 
from society, citizens 
are more likely to engage 
with an issue on the basis 
of values or ideology 
rather than local personal 
interest.
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CASE STUDY
STANDARDS: SUPPORTING EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 
AS AN ACCELERATOR OF INNOVATION
Scott Steedman (Director of Standards, British Standards Institution)
Positioned alongside regulation, voluntary consensus standards that have been developed with full stakeholder engagement and open 
public consultation can provide an invaluable tool 
to share information and to build trust in new and 
emerging technologies.  Although the use of standards 
as an accelerator of innovation is well understood in 
other major economies (notably in Germany, where 
standards play a strong part in the activities of the 
Fraunhofer institutes), in the United Kingdom there is 
a poor understanding of the potential for standards to 
act as alternatives to regulation. This important tool is 
therefore frequently ignored in UK innovation strategy 
and planning.
Standards provide a powerful alternative to 
regulation in many areas, but can be particularly 
effective in supporting new and emerging technologies 
where public trust needs to be maintained. One 
particular case study, which shows the effectiveness of 
standards building up over time, is the emergence of 
nanotechnology (as outlined in the case 
study by Kamal Hossain in Chapter 4).
The ability to manipulate materials 
at very small length scales to create 
products with higher-value properties 
and functions was first identified as a 
potential source of significant wealth 
creation by the UK government through 
its creation of the LINK Nanotechnology 
Programme in the 1980s. 
This was followed by 
the Taylor Report on 
nanotechnology1 in 2002, 
which recommended that 
the government should 
invest in stimulating innovation and encouraging 
successful commercial exploitation of this 
technology. 
At the same time, public concern was growing 
over the potentially unknown and unquantified risks 
associated with nanomaterials, particularly in relation 
to the possible hazards they posed to humans and the 
environment. Environmental pressure groups demanded
that the technology should be subject to stronger 
regulation.
In 2004 the British Standards Institution (BSI)2, in its 
role as the UK National Standards Body, pioneered 
the development of the first international standards 
committee on nanotechnologies, as well as a UK 
standards committee to mirror this work. These 
bodies developed strategic plans that highlighted the 
three main priorities for standards development: 
• Terminology and Nomenclature
• Measurement and Characterization
• Health, Safety, and Environment
Since then the expert committees have developed 
a number of standards, including vocabularies, 
occupational health and safety guides, toxicity 
testing standards, and characterization test methods. 
Laboratories testing against these standards can be 
accredited by the United Kingdom Accreditation 
Service (UKAS) to provide further confidence in 
the emerging technology. The development of these 
standards of best practice is one important factor 
that has enabled governments to avoid introducing 
any legislation specific to nanotechnologies, despite 
pressure to regulate the industry. 
Recently, BSI has been 
working closely with Innovate 
UK (formerly the government’s 
Technology Strategy Board) 
to demonstrate the value that 
timely standardization 
can bring to priority 
areas such as offshore 
renewable energy, 
assisted living (such as 
new technologies to support the elderly), 
cell therapy and synthetic biology. In each 
area, a landscape and roadmap that identifies 
priority areas for new standards was 
developed through a process of stakeholder 
engagement in a similar way to that used for 
nanomaterials ten years ago.
The success of this approach is increasingly widely 
recognized. Investment is now needed to extend 
the concept so that standards advice becomes 
permanently embedded within the Catapult 
technology and innovation centres, as well as 
research communities across the United Kingdom.
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that engage with policy decisions on risk and innovation is 
to promote exclusively the evidence that supports their 
objectives or even to manufacture such evidence22. This is 
an inevitable part of political processes but, as noted above, 
upstream engagement tends to push dialogue towards 
issues of value and ideology and in such cases there is much 
less willingness on the part of protagonists to reconsider 
evidence on the basis of its scientific merit23 (Table 1). 
Such challenges downgrade the value of research findings 
as evidence to support decision making and policymakers 
are finding that science and technology in some areas are 
becoming less governable as the evidence base for decisions 
is challenged and eroded.
Impact on innovation 
Technology foresight has contributed to government support 
for the development of innovative technologies for over 
30 years, but human capabilities in this area are notoriously 
flawed. Now, based on the new governance agenda we have 
included risk foresight (through the precautionary principle) 
and foresighting public needs and desires (through upstream 
engagement). In the case of advanced innovative technologies 
with product lead times considerably longer than five years, 
the uncertainty inherent in foresight becomes multiplied 
several-fold. The governance-based approach, promoted in a 
spirit of optimism as a means to achieve more democratic and 
more robust political processes and decisions, has distributed 
power more equitably across societal groups — but this has, 
in many cases, resulted merely in greater complexity and 
confusion, and longer delays in decision making.
There were sound reasons behind the changes in policy 
decision making outlined above. However, evidence is 
now beginning to accumulate that the complexity we 
have introduced into our governance systems through the 
upstream focus of risk-related policies and engagement, 
coupled with the increased complexity and rigidity of 
Technology foresight has 
contributed to government 
support for the 
development of innovative 
technologies for over 
30 years.
Upstream engagement 
tends to push dialogue 
towards issues of value 
and ideology, with much 
less willingness on the 
part of protagonists to 
reconsider evidence 
on the basis of its 
scientific merit.
product regulatory systems, is stifling potentially useful 
innovation in addition to the desired impact of avoiding 
potentially hazardous developments.
For example, the more complex, lengthy and expensive 
our governance systems become, the more innovation 
becomes dominated by large multinational companies24.  As 
observed in the GM crops case study, no small company 
with an innovative idea can hope to reach a market without 
doing so through a large multinational company, through 
selling the intellectual property, a straightforward buy-out 
or some other form of collaboration. Small companies 
therefore develop their business models with such outcomes 
in mind, leading to a focus on innovations that are likely to fit 
with the strategies of the large companies. These companies 
in turn will be most receptive to incremental innovations 
that will enable them to improve on their current products 
or processes by making them more efficient or more 
sustainable. Path-breaking, disruptive innovations that could 
potentially contribute to pressing societal needs will either 
meet with self-censorship by scientists and innovators or 
will fail to attract funding along their development pathway. 
The paradox here is that the domination of the agrochemical 
and pharmaceutical industry sectors by large multinational 
companies, so strongly criticized by environmental advocacy 
groups, is a direct result of the kind of regulatory system 
that they themselves have been instrumental in encouraging.
A comparison between the recent innovation experience 
of information and communication technologies (ICT), 
where there have been several waves of disruptive 
innovation over the past twenty years, and life sciences 
where innovation has been largely incremental despite 
enormous public investment in the basic science, illustrates 
this point. Likewise, failure by large multinational companies 
to develop products to meet evident human needs (new 
antibiotics to address the challenge of antibiotic resistance, 
or GM crops to control pests and diseases in non-
commodity crops) relates to the incompatibility of such 
developments with current industry business models that 
are a direct result of the regulatory systems that apply in 
these sectors.
The new governance agenda and upstream engagement 
are probably here to stay, but we have yet to learn how to 
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accommodate their combined pressures in a way that will 
circumvent their potentially corrosive impact on innovative 
developments that could meet important societal needs. 
A more adaptive approach to the governance of risk 
and innovation
During the twentieth century, the focus of innovation 
moved from chemistry to information and communication 
technologies, and the bio-economy is now expected to be 
the growth engine of the twenty-first century. The innovation 
trajectories in each of these areas are (or will be) very 
different, but research on ‘what works’ in innovative business 
models, taking account of the complexity in the innovation 
environment arising from new governance approaches, has 
been very limited. Likewise, there has been little socio-
economic research on the interactions between risk 
regulatory systems and innovation, as opposed to the very 
large amount of research on the new governance agenda. 
It is becoming increasingly clear that our governance 
systems for advanced innovative technologies are not always 
fit for purpose. Product regulatory systems that have built 
up by a process of slow accretion over a period of years 
are now so onerous that even multinational companies are 
finding it difficult to develop new innovative products. The 
new governance agenda was intended to improve policy 
and regulatory decisions by making them more democratic. 
Instead it has led to a less democratic and less evidence-
based system, in which risk regulation and restriction of 
specific areas of scientific and innovative activity are seen 
by some governments and policy makers, particularly in the 
European Union, as valid responses to societal pressures 
or the need for public reassurance, rather than a means of 
dealing with risks for which there is an evidence base25.
Until recently, flaws in regulatory systems related to over-
regulation of innovative products and processes have not 
been a matter of great concern for governments, except 
where there has been public pressure to address such 
problems, as in the case of the accelerated development 
of drugs to treat AIDS. This is in contrast to considerable 
government attention to the need for ‘better regulation’ in 
non-risk related areas. In a state of ignorance, or at least 
insouciance, the assumption has been that this hidden tax on 
innovation processes can be accommodated by companies 
while still delivering products at an affordable price. This 
chapter has focused on the areas where the current risk 
governance deficits are greatest and where the need for 
systemic change is most pressing, for example in areas linked 
to the bio-economy, but these challenges may spread in the 
near future to other advanced innovative technologies.
Such systemic factors can mitigate against effective 
decision making in at least two ways: (i) the system can 
become so amorphous and unstructured that there is no 
clear basis for decisions and also no clearly identified locus 
for decision making; or (ii) it can become so complex, rigid 
and constrained by legal and customary precedent that it is 
incapable of adapting to new threats or opportunities. The 
bio-economy is in danger of experiencing the first of these 
threats in the context of the new governance agenda and the 
There has been little 
socio-economic research 
on the interactions 
between risk regulatory 
systems and innovation.
second in the context of conventional risk regulation.
Therefore recommendations related to the adoption 
of a precautionary approach (see the ‘NGO Perspective’ 
in Section 2’s fracking case study) should elicit a broad-
based policy response that takes account of the interests 
and values of protagonists and the costs and benefits of 
alternative options, as outlined in Chapter 4’s neonicotinoid 
pesticide case study. In a similar vein, the case study on 
bisphenol A in Chapter 3 points to the need for an increased 
focus on scientific evidence as a basis for regulatory 
decision making even, or perhaps particularly, where 
this is undertaken within the European Union’s overall 
precautionary regulatory system.
Changing the behaviour of innovation or regulatory systems 
will require finding the right policy levers that will adapt or 
re-align the relevant system components, and new smarter 
approaches to regulation and governance are the most likely 
pressure points to deliver better innovation-related value for 
money from public investment in basic science. 
The two case studies included in this chapter provide very 
interesting pointers to future directions that could be taken 
to meet these needs. Standards developed through dialogue 
between stakeholders and companies, to ensure the quality 
of products and processes and to govern health, safety and 
environmental impacts, have a much better record of being 
adaptive in the face of new technological developments than 
our current regulatory systems (see nanotechnology case 
study). This is not to suggest that standards could totally 
replace these regulatory systems, but much could be learned 
from the adaptive processes they have used so successfully. 
The alternative risk management strategy proposed for 
novel crops by David Baulcombe (see GM crops case study) 
could be a starting point for re-thinking the European 
regulatory system in a way that would be sufficiently radical 
to enable re-shaping and reinvigorating of innovation for 
European crop production. Each approach has the potential 
to complement the other, and together they could enable us 
to deploy our insights more intelligently than we have done 
to date.
The above commentary should not be seen to counsel 
against the elements of the new governance approach or 
engagement, upstream or downstream. However, we need 
to learn how to overcome these systemic threats without 
jeopardizing the safety and effectiveness of the innovative 
products and processes that we will need to meet future 
societal challenges.
